Linguistic research focused on describing semantic and pragmatic mechanisms of humour appears to have been dominated during the past two decades by the General Theory of Verbal Humour (Attardo and Raskin 1991; Raskin and Attardo 1994; Attardo 1994 Attardo , 2001 Attardo et al. 2002, inter alia) , an offshoot of Raskin's (1985) Semantic Script Theory of Humor. The pivotal tenet of the General Theory of Verbal Humour captures canned jokes and longer humorous narratives by means of six hierarchically organised Knowledge Resources, the most significant of which are the script opposition/overlap and the logical mechanism. Contrary to its name, the model does not explicitly account for all humour forms, even if intermittent attempts are also made at applying it to the analysis of conversational data (Norrick 2003; Archakis and Tsakona 2005) . Raskin and Attardo's methodologically complex model undergoes constant development, furthered not only by the original proponents but also other researchers. On the other hand, irrespective of the theory's attractiveness, a number of its subordinate tenets and conceptualisations can be considered elusive, not fully elaborated on and even fallacious (see e.g. Ritchie 2004; Dynel forthcoming) . Also, the dominance of this framework does not mean that other semantic, pragmatic or cognitive approaches aiming to shed light on the workings of various humorous forms should be discredited and dismissed as being specious or, at least, less plausible. On the contrary, some proposals are more tenable, given that they usurp no right to be allembracing theories and thus describe certain phenomena more adequately.
Linguistic research on humour mechanisms is acknowledged to enjoy a cognitive orientation. By necessity, the studies on the comprehension of verbal humour entail the description of cognitive processes. The conceptual framework provided by cognitive linguistics for language use in general should easily capture the nature of humour, simultaneously shedding light on its distinctive features (Giora 1991; Brône et al. 2006) . One budding area of research presents humour phenomena in view of cognitive construal operations (e.g. Coulson 2005; Veale et al. 2006) . Nevertheless, humour studies need not rely heavily on existing cognitive linguistic theories, but may only resort to viable concepts or postulates, facilitating the explanation of humour's mechanisms. A variety of cognitive theories and findings are particularly useful in the description of on-line interpretation processes (e.g. Giora 1991 Giora , 2003 Coulson 2001; Coulson and Kutas 2001; Coulson et al. 2006) . Of vital importance are also psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic studies on humour comprehension processes (e.g. Vaid et al. 2005; Coulson and Severens 2007; Uekermann and Daum 2007) .
What is significant, the primary mechanism underlying humour is grounded in cognitive, both psychological and linguistic, proposals. The generalisation emergent from the bulk of literature is that humour invariably arises from incongruity, as already observed by many psychologists and linguists (e.g. Forabosco 1992; Ritchie 2004; Partington 2006) . The notion of incongruity as the correlate 2 of humour is known to have been initially advocated in philosophical and psychological writings. It was only later that it aroused interest also within linguistic studies on humour, where it is commonly assumed that incongruity alone does not suffice as an explanation for verbal humour but must be followed by the resolution stage. Broadly speaking, the incongruity-resolution (I-R) model, credited primarily to Suls (1972 Suls ( , 1983 ) but also to Shultz (1972) , assumes that incongruity is first observed and later resolved, i.e. made congruous. This broadly conceptualised model will obviously have an array of sub-mechanisms in particular humour forms (for an overview, see Forabosco 1992; Raskin 1985; Attardo 1994; Ritchie 2004; Martin 2007; Dynel forthcoming, inter alia) .
Most contemporary humour linguists expounding on the formal or cognitive mechanisms of humour narrow down the scope of investigation to canned jokes, admittedly due to their heuristic advantages over other humour forms (cf. Attardo and Raskin 1991) . Nevertheless, there are authors (e.g. Norrick 1993 Norrick , 2003 Kotthoff 2006b Kotthoff , 2007 Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997; Veale et al. 2006 ) who do fill the lacuna in humour research, examining, according to chosen criteria, forms used in everyday interactions, which tend to be captured under the umbrella term conversational joking (Norrick 1993) . However, to avoid associations with the act of joking or joke telling, forms such as teasing, banter, witticisms or humorous lexemes could be collectively referred to as conversational humour (cf. Coates 2007). Usually, articles tackle particular humour phenomena in isolation, distinguished as pragmatic categories or formal realisations, which need not be placed on any hierarchical tier in humour taxonomy. Writings pertain, for example, to stock conversational witticisms (Norrick 1984 (Norrick , 1993 (Norrick , 2003 , teasing (e.g. Norrick 1993; Hay 2000; Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997; Lampert and Ervin-Tripp 2006) , banter (Norrick 1993) , riddles (Dienhart 1999) , adversarial humour , puns (e.g. Attardo 1994; Norrick 1993) , story puns (Binsted and Ritchie 2001), or parody (Rossen-Knill and Henry 1997; Mascha 2008 ). Yet another prominent form of humour is irony (e.g. Giora 2001; Jorgensen 1996; Kotthoff 2003; Attardo 2000 Attardo , 2001 Partington 2006 Partington , 2007 . It must be remembered, however, that this trope may, but does not have to, overlap with humour. This is why not all of the extensive literature on irony should be subsumed under humour research.
On the whole, sociolinguistics, sometimes supported by socio-psychological findings, gives insight into humour's functions in interpersonal communication (see e.g. Norrick 1993; Attardo 1994; Cann et al. 1997; Martin 2007 Pragmatically oriented articles and books embrace basically all the topics and viewpoints listed above, irrespective of whether or not authors do resort to core pragmatic postulates and models. This is because pragmatics, whose subject matter is language in use, will naturally capitalise on proposals and findings generated in all the strands of linguistics, as well as other realms of study, such as sociology, social and cognitive psychology or anthropology. Even though humour proposals may develop upon pragmatic theories of communication, e.g. the Gricean model (e.g. Raskin 1985; Raskin and Attardo 1994; Attardo 1990 Attardo , 1993 Attardo , 1994 Attardo , 2006 , relevance theory (e.g. Yus 2003; Curcó 1995 Curcó , 1996 or politeness theory (e.g. Zajdman 1995), they appear to be in minority in humour literature. Transcending radical pragmatics, pragmatic humour studies enjoy greater diversification and, consequently, flourish. Apart from all the areas of interest enumerated in the paragraphs above, another orientation of research concerns humour's forms and roles within media discourse genres, such as advertising rhetoric or the language of the press (e.g. van Mulken 2005; Bucaria 2004 ). In all likelihood, this list of topics will not be exhaustive. The emergent conclusion is that the pragmatics of humour is a broad church, encompassing a wide spectrum of interests and perspectives.
This special issue of Lodz Papers in Pragmatics comprises seven contributions presenting an authorial viewpoint will give readers food for thought and provoke future research, whether supportive or polemical. The first three articles, rooted in cognitivist research, present the foundations of humorous mechanisms.
Orna Peleg, Rachel Giora and Ofer Fein report on their psycholinguistic research findings on the graded salience hypothesis, in the light of two experiments verifying the impact of contextual effects on lexical processing. Further evidence is thus adduced that the most salient meanings of ambiguous lexemes are invariably activated, irrespective of their contextual misfit. Contextual bias in favour of less salient meanings appears to be insignificant at the lexical access stage, even if ambiguities occur in the final sentential position, where context should have a greater bearing on their interpretation. Although the authors explore the perception processes of ambiguities which are not directly conducive to humour, their findings will certainly prove germane to cognitive studies on humour couched in lexical ambiguities, i.e. puns. Giovannantonio Forabosco's discursive paper gives an overview of the multidisciplinary research on incongruity and the incongruity-resolution approach in humour studies, paying attention mainly (but not exclusively) to the psychological perspective and research findings. Forabosco proposes that incongruity can be conceived of as a diversion from a cognitive model of reference. Creating a patchwork image of the workings and foundations of incongruity as a mechanism underlying humour, the author does not refrain from discussing a number of queries and counterarguments. The conclusion, hardly surprising, is that incongruity is a tenable conceptualisation of humour perception processes and is still fertile ground for further research.
Tony Veale propounds an innovative postulate of figure-ground duality as an intrinsic mechanism underlying both nonverbal, i.e. pictorial, and verbal humour. First, the author introduces the cognitive construal, as originally defined in psychological literature, in order to show that it can be employed as a heuristic tool to account for the workings of humorous images. Further, Veale discusses figureground duality as the underpinning of various forms of verbal humour, and critically addresses the widely acknowledged models of humour analysis, i.e. the incongruity approach and a few tenets of the General Theory of Verbal Humour.
The next two articles are written from the perspective of discourse analysis, but are focused on divergent humorous phenomena.
In their collaborative article, Neal Norrick and Janine Klein examine forms and functions of disruptive humour produced by pupils in an elementary school classroom. The authors intertwine succinct surveys of related literature with discourse analyses of conversational extracts, focusing on unruly children's verbalisations and teachers' responses. The emergent extrapolation is that "class clowns'" humour-oriented behaviour serves the purpose of identity construction.
Stephanie Schnurr and Charley Rowe's contribution is devoted to the discussion of subversive humour occurring in workplace emails. The paper opens with an introduction to the studies on humour in workplace and subversive humour as well as on the new, albeit fast-developing, area of research concerning e-mails. The authors launch a data analysis, proving that, via humour, workers in powerful positions can "legitimately" voice their criticism against bureaucratic norms, by means of poking fun at normative practices or re-defining organisational reality.
The last two articles investigate humour phenomena from pragmatic theoretical standpoints, albeit representing two competitive strands, post-Gricean and neoGricean.
Francisco Yus champions a relevance-theoretic four-fold classification of jokes, which are demonstrated to entail diversified inferential activity on the hearer's part. Having briefly revisited a few pertinent tenets of relevance theory and its import for humour studies, the author categorises jokes into those which are hinged on: the invalidation of inferred explicit content, a clash between explicit and implicit information, the audience's recovery of implicit premises or implicated conclusions, and broad contextual assumptions on social or cultural society values.
This issue of LPP closes with its editor's article, whose aim is to argue against Raskin and Attardo's well-entrenched approach to humour as a phenomenon standing vis-à-vis the Gricean model of communication. The article takes as the departure point the recapitulation of the Gricean model's pertinent premises germane to substantiating that humour violates neither the CP nor the subordinate maxims and is perfectly embraced by Grice's rationality-based model of communication, in which maxims can be legitimately flouted for the sake of reaching a communicative goal, i.e. generating a humorous effect. 
